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1 ‘Mapping’ Hungary between West and East 
 
There is a very influential view that the border of the Western culture (at 
least in the Middle Ages and early modern times) runs along the line of 
Western and Eastern Christianity (by and large coinciding with the 
eastern borders of historic Hungary and the historic Polish core 
territory).
1 
Another influential view also exists about the historical inner 
borders of Europe: that the territory lying east of the Elbe and Leitha 
rivers have been a region with ‘mixed’ Western and Eastern (European) 
characteristics in the cultural, social, political senses. The most important 
piece of information necessary to define Hungary’s position is on the 
map: this country lies between these ‘borders’. 
In early modern times Hungary was a part of the Habsburg Empire – 
in some periods as a rebellious and repressed region, in other times as a 
half-autonomous country, which in the last half of the nineteenth century 
was a formally independent and equal co-state within the Empire. With 
the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918–20 Hungary’s 
territory has reduced by two-thirds (nowadays it is about 93,000 square 
kilometres; the population is about ten million). Between 1945 and 1990 
the country was under Soviet occupation, and its political, economic, and 
social systems were transformed into state socialism. After 1990 the 
country became a democracy and a member of NATO (1999) and the 
European Union (2004). 
 
1.1 Between the ‘European’ and ‘non-European’ Family Models 
 
Last but not least there is a third line which is important in the 
perspective of this: the so-called Hajnal’s line. Writing about marriage 
and family, John Hajnal differentiated ‘the European model’ (which is 
characterised by relatively late marriage age, high non-marriage rate, low 
                                                 
1
 South-east of this border is the Balkans, and eastwards is Eastern Europe. We use 
these terms as labels for macro-regions which have relevance in respect of social history, 
but this border definition does not intend to exclude these regions from contemporary 
European integration. 
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fertility rate, and nuclear families), and the ‘non- European model’ 
(which is characterised by relatively early marriage age, low non-
marriage, high fertility rates and extended families). The historical 
demographer drew an imaginary line from St Petersburg (Russia) to 
Trieste (now Italy, but in the early modern times belonging to the 
Habsburg monarchy) which divided Europe into two parts by these two 
models.
2
 That could imply that Hungary or the greater part of the 
historical country fell east of this social historical border. If we accept 
Hajnal’s idea, Hungary belonged to the ‘non-European model’ with all its 
features. However, in contrast with this argument other social historians’ 
research
3
 has pointed out that the situation of Hungary was more 
complicated.
4
 Despite being socially, ethnically, and regionally 
differentiated, in large parts of the country the nuclear family was 
prevalent even in early modernity (however, with lower marriage age and 
higher marriage rates than Western Europe). 
To sum up, in the nineteenth century, Hungary showed the features of 
both Hajnal’s ‘European’ and ‘non-European’ marriage models at the 
same time. 
 
1.2 Between the ‘First Modernisation’ and the ‘Compressed 
Modernisation’ 
 
It is also not easy to typify Hungarian modernity. The tenets of 
modernisation such as industrialisation, urbanisation, marketisation, etc. 
began to emerge on one hand later than in Western Europe, but on the 
other hand they were still beginning to emerge even in the nineteenth 
century. 
Although it seems there is no perfect index for characterising the 
modernisation process, the rate of employment in agriculture can be 
useful in this regard. This rate, which was above 80–90 per cent in every 
pre-modern society,
5
 began to diminish in England in the eighteenth 
century, and in some Western European countries (Belgium, France) in 
the first half of the nineteenth century. Meanwhile in a number of 
countries described as being ‘late modernisers’ this rate began to 
diminish rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Hajnal (1965). 
3
 For example that of Andorka and Faragó (1983) and Faragó (1999). 
4
 Later even John Hajnal seemed to accept their argument (Hajnal 1983, 92). 
5
 Of course this was less in smaller city-states. 
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Figure 1. Agricultural employment in selected countries, 1801–2000 
(percentage of total employment). Source: Berend and Ránki (1976, 481; 
1987, 26); Diedericks et al. (1995, 199, 205); Diószegi et al. (1997, 145); 
Gergely (2003, 345); Hungarian Statistical Office; World Bank World 
Development Indicators. 
 
Although the data set presented in Figure 1 does not conclusively prove 
anything in itself, it perhaps demonstrates our thesis that the 
development trajectory of Hungary can be situated between the countries 
of ‘First Modernisation’ (typical of some Western European countries)
6
 
and those of ‘Compressed Modernisation’ (typical of most countries on 
all continents).
7
 The modernisation in Hungary began relatively early, 
but the process always dropped behind Western Europe, which was 
always the most important point of reference for the country. On the 
other hand the process was disrupted and distorted at several periods in 
the twentieth century. 
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For our understanding of the present situation there is a special 
significance to the distortion caused by the forced modernisation of the 
Communist regimes between 1945 and 1990. The social and economic 
policy of this established a system which turned out to be dysfunctional 
in many areas at the same time. For example, the economic system was 
out of date from the beginning because it preferred heavy industry over 
the service and the knowledge-based sectors; the economy continuously 
produced and reproduced shortages, meanwhile systematically lavished 
with resources (raw materials and labour).
8
 From the perspective of our 
study two aspects require special attention: (1) Due to the dominant 
ownership of the state and because of the shortages in the economy,
9
 
enterprises were insensitive to costs, and they tried to store every kind of 
resource including manpower; and (2) this endeavour produced almost 
full employment amongst both men and women. One of the key issues of 
the familist discourse (see Figure 2), namely the statement that female 
paid work emerged in the age of state socialism, can be considered a 
myth if we examine the long-term tendencies. 
 
 
Figure 2. Actively employed women, 1900–1990 (percentage of all 
women). Source: Hungarian Statistical Office. 
 
Of course the age of state socialism brought some major changes. 
Perhaps the most relevant change was constrained industrialisation and 
the forced reorganisation of the agriculture, which pushed women into 
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the labour market. The rate of employment and full-time education 
amongst women increased such that by 1980 amongst females aged 
between fifteen and fifty-four years, only 6.8 per cent were 
housewives.
10
 
Summing up, the familist argument that the socialist system forced 
women into the workplace is not a totally false statement, but it is 
exaggerated. Before 1945 most women had paid work (or worked on 
their family land) for at least some period of their life. The change after 
1945 had been drastic for middle-class women only, and this strata, the 
former middle class, could be considered as one of the losers in the 
Communist takeover, as one of the ‘class enemies’ of the new system. It 
is noteworthy that despite state discrimination in the first period of 
socialism, most children and grandchildren of the former middle class 
were able to rekindle their family’s middle-class status. On the one hand 
this process of status reproduction is a revealing example that social 
familism could run as a very efficient mechanism on the micro-level: 
despite affirmative action for workers’ children and political and 
administrative discrimination against children of the former middle class, 
members of latter category still had a greater chance of becoming 
intellectuals
11
 or ‘socialist entrepreneurs’
12
 with the help of cultural 
capital inherited from their family. On the other hand, the experiences 
and family traditions of this social group also had relevant influences on 
the later familist discourse. 
Due to the low level of efficiency of the state economy there was a 
(quasi) market ‘second economy’ in practically every European socialist 
country, but in Hungary it was present in a particularly extended way.
13
 
In the latter days of socialism in three-quarters of all families at least one 
member participated in this second economy, but, with a few exceptions, 
largely as a part-time worker while they were also full-time employees of 
the state.
14
 This structure implies a more or less conscious restriction of 
their commitments and endeavours in the state sector, and self-
exploitation in the second economy. Furthermore the toleration and 
partial legalisation of the second economy was not equal to its 
legitimisation – on the contrary the official discourse insisted that private 
ownership and the market, even in this restricted form, were only 
temporary concessions. 
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1.3 Modernisation and Trust 
 
Due to their particular position inside the Habsburg Empire, until 1918 
the majority of Hungarians had ambivalent attitudes towards Hungarian 
institutions, including the government: they viewed them as both their 
own home institutions and as agents of a foreign power at the same 
time.
15
 In the following periods, between 1914 and 1990, there were two 
world wars,
16
 three military occupations, two revolutions (both 
repressed), genocides, red and white terrors, great territorial 
rearrangements, violently driven social restructuring, and there were nine 
changes of political system.
17
 Until 1990 no regime was democratic and 
in practice all governments treated one or some groups of society as 
hostile. In all likelihood there are very few families in Hungary who have 
no family members who victims of state discrimination for a while. The 
forced social changes between 1945 and 1960 in themselves reinforced 
the distrust of institutions and (re)produced a crisis of values. 
According to the European Values Study survey, the level of trust in 
institutions in 1991 was diminished significantly compared to 1982, 
since when the decrease has been continuous but smaller.
18
 We have to 
take with a grain of salt the measurement of trust level in the situation of 
the single-party dictatorship: in those times any ‘trust’ which existed 
would be partly mimicry, partly a response to the feeling of stability, and 
the expectation that this system would last ‘forever’ (these expectations, 
of course, are hardly separable from ‘real’ trust). In the second half of 
1989 when the Soviet camp in Central Europe collapsed, the level of 
distrust mushroomed, partly because the former latent mistrust became 
open, partly because the feeling of stability quickly vanished.
19
 
Developments since 1989–90 have not contributed to the 
reconstruction (or construction) of general social trust. A lot of people 
expected the change of political system to usher in not only freedom but 
also a standard of living similar to that of Western European countries. 
However, even in the Central European region Hungary’s achievement 
has been the worst in the area of economic growth. The state has 
withdrawn from the control of production, but state redistribution 
invariably plays an important role for family incomes.
20
 The 
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 However, both approaches had some relevance. 
16
 Hungary was defeated in both world wars. 
17
 Some amongst these systems were very short-lived, but the two longest, the Horthy 
and the Kádár régimes, were radically different in their beginnings, ‘golden ages’, and 
twilights. 
18
 Hajdu (2013). 
19
 Giczi and Sik (2009). 
20
 Szalai (2007). 
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government’s policy is too paternalistic to be in accordance with 
democratic standards, which has generated discontentment amongst 
people. However most people  are also unhappy with the state’s attempt 
to withdraw from its former roles in the social, educational, cultural, and 
health spheres. These two groups overlap to a great extent and they 
constitute the decisive majority of Hungarian society. 
When looking at Hungary it is relevant the sociologist Ságvári’s note: 
‘To build a culture of trust requires a slow process with many small 
steps, meanwhile distrust’s solidification into a cultural norm can occur 
far faster, in the wake of some relevant event experienced directly or 
indirectly.’
21
 In Hungary, distrust apparently became a solid cultural 
norm even in the earlier periods of the twentieth century, and the recent 
era since 1990 has ‘only’ reproduced this culture through marketisation 
and political conflicts. This distrust culture is probably present in other 
countries too thathave similar conditions, namely the traditions of 
distrust and current social and political situations that are not suited to 
the building a culture of trust. According to the fourth wave of the 
European Social Survey in 2008–9, amongst thirty countries Hungary 
was twenty-second in the generalised level of trust.
22
 It is noteworthy 
that all except one of the last twelve countries on this scale are located in 
the Balkans or Eastern Europe, or are post-Communist Central European 
countries. This low level of trust can enhance the phenomenon of 
familism (see below) directly or, due to the weakness of civil society, 
indirectly in every society.
23
 
To sum up, the situation is as follows: low levels of trust in institutions 
including the state; governments making paternalistic endeavours, but 
without the tools to maintain the formerly present level of social policy; 
a general distrustful habitus which tends to work in a self-confirming 
way; and a continuous crisis in terms of values. Familism is one of the 
social and individual reactions to this long and complex crisis. 
 
1.4 From Traditional Pluralism to the Post-War Standard Family 
 
Relevant to the aims of this chapter it should be stressed that in early 
modern times in Hungary there prevailed a kind of traditional pluralism 
in the realm of the family structure, and this pluralism lasted until the 
middle of the twentieth century. As Faragó
24
 argued, the Hungarian 
people adapted their marriage and family forms to changes in the 
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economy and society in a very ‘plastic’ way. He showed that during the 
period 1787–1828 the ratio of extended families increased somewhat in 
Hungary. At the beginning of the period more counties were 
characterised by the nuclear family and during the following four 
decades this ratio changed. Two different causes stand behind the very 
same demographic behaviour. By the end of the eighteenth century an 
overpopulation crisis emerged in Hungary (just like in other Western 
European countries). In the northern counties the overpopulation was 
coupled with a lack of land. Peasant families tried to protect themselves 
from pauperisation by using birth control and also through keeping 
young couples inside their original families, thus forming extended 
families. In contrast, in the southern part of the country peasant families 
could get more new land, but without the modernisation of farming they 
needed more hands to cultivate them. Founding extended families 
seemed to be an appropriate solution to get more labour. Both cases 
demonstrate the strong effect of belated modernisation on family 
structures. 
The ‘uniformisation’ of family structure happened in the first two to 
three decades of the post-war period: this chapter will name the result of 
this process the Post-war Standard Family, or PSF. The most important 
characteristics of this model were as follows: 
 
1. The overwhelming majority of the population got married (the 
proportion of never-married persons was lower than 5 per cent). 
2. Marriage began at a relatively early age (in 1970 the male mean 
age at first marriage was 24.5 years and the female age was 21.6 
years) and this was taken for granted as a norm and the 
prevailing practice. Cohabitation without marriage was regarded 
as a deviant lifestyle, practised mainly by undereducated people. 
It was also exceptional that young adults formed a one-person 
household. 
3. The number of divorces reached a relatively high number by the 
1970s and remained at this level, but the majority of divorced 
persons aspired to remarry. 
4. The majority of couples had children, although significantly 
fewer children than in former decades. 
 
In the ‘golden age’ of the PSF, which lasted from 1960 to the mid-1980s, 
the rate of marriage amongst males aged fifteen or over reached 70–72 
per cent. This ratio was 60–62 per cent in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Similar data for women were lower because of their higher life 
expectancy and their lesser chance of remarrying after divorce. 
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The Hungarian PSF had some similarities with the post-war Western 
or Japanese family,
25
 but there was a significant difference too: in 
Hungary this period was not ‘the age of housewives’. On the contrary, 
under state socialism (1945–90) typically both husbands and wives were 
full-time wage-earners as employees of the state (see data below). The 
reason was the socialist system’s insensitivity to the cost of labour 
(which generated eagerness for every kind of employment) and 
depressed wages (which made it almost impossible for most families to 
make a living from a single income). 
In return for acceptance of low wages, the state ran an extended social 
service system and tolerated people’s activity in the second economy for 
additional income. The wage policy and social policy of the state 
economy was of outstanding importance for family formation, as married 
people were preferred to the unmarried. A single person had a minimal 
chance of getting an apartment through state distribution and the low 
level of the average income made it impossible to accumulate enough 
money to rent or buy a flat via market sources. Every policy and social 
institution pushed people to start a family. In other words, social 
familism played important role in people starting a family. 
To summarise: the Hungarian PSF was a relatively modern type of 
family with some traditional features. The overwhelming majority of the 
population was living in families which were made up of married 
couples (two wage-earners) and two children. 
 
2 The Post-PSF Situation or the New Pluralism of Family Forms 
 
2.1 Marital Status 
 
The new pluralisation of family forms started in the mid-1980s, and this 
process has continued to the present time. The changing structure of the 
economy, the broadening possibilities for enrolment in university, the 
growing career opportunities for both young men and women on the one 
hand and unemployment and growing inequalities on the other hand all 
had some effect on family forms. Not only real factors but attitudes and 
values have also changed during the last thirty years. However, when 
studying the practice of gender and family roles and the relevant 
attitudes, a peculiar contradiction emerges: while in terms of several real 
factors the Hungarian population belongs to the more modern segment 
on the (diverse) field of Europe, in terms of ideals the Hungarian 
population takes the opposite position. Hungary is one of the countries 
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where respondents agree to the greatest extent with traditional attitude 
statements concerning family and the roles of men and women – in 
certain respects not only by international comparison but in absolute 
number too. These facts have been demonstrated in the past decade by 
several different studies.
26
 As a result of these complex effects a more 
pluralistic picture can be drawn about the Hungarian family in 2010. This 
chapter shows the most relevant changes concerning family forms and 
attitudes and also the gaps between these attitudes and real demographic 
behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of males (fifteen years and older) by marital status, 
1980–2010. Source: Demographic Yearbook (2010). 
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 See Tóth (1998); Pongrácz et al. (2001); Pongrácz and Spéder (2003); Blaskó (2006). 
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Figure 4. Percentage of females (fifteen years and older) by marital 
status, 1980–2010. Source: Demographic Yearbook (2010). 
 
Figures 3 and 4 present the changes in marital status in a very obvious 
way. Since 1980 (the ‘golden age of the PSF’) the ratio of married 
persons has dramatically decreased amongst men and women. In the 
whole adult population, 20 per cent fewer married persons can be found 
now than thirty years ago. On the other hand, the ratio of never-married 
persons has doubled in the case of females and also increased by 17 per 
cent for males. The growing rate of divorced persons is also a significant 
change. We have no exact data, just estimations, about the very different 
new types of partnership and family forms (cohabitation, LAT relation, 
mosaic families, etc.) as relatively little research is being directing 
towards these new partnerships and family forms. In the mainstream of 
Hungarian research on family issues these new forms are seen as some 
kind of ‘deviant’ practice, with the most important thing to consider 
being how it might be possible to make people turn back to the ‘normal’ 
forms of family. 
There are no significant differences between the marital status of 
males living in towns or villages or in settlements with more or fewer 
inhabitants
27
. Regions with different levels of economic development 
also do not show different types of marital status in the case of males. 
The only slightly significant difference can be found in the ratio of 
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divorced men. This is highest in middle-size towns where it reaches 10.3 
per cent of males of fifteen years old and older. The lowest rate is in the 
communities with the fewest inhabitants (at 8.5 per cent). 
On the other hand, the marital status of females does show differences 
by region and community type. As the data show, many more never-
married females live in Budapest than in other cities and especially than 
in small villages. Conversely there are more married females amongst 
village inhabitants than in towns. Divorced females are living in higher 
numbers in Budapest and also in other big cities. The data show that 
relatively more young women remain unmarried or divorced in these 
urbanised communities than in other communities. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Percentage females (fifteen years and older) by marital status 
as of 1 January 2011. Source: Demographic Yearbook (2010). 
 
2.2 Marriage and Divorce 
 
In the process of more pluralistic forms of family taking shape, 
obviously the most striking changes have happened within marriage and 
other forms of cohabitation. While the number of marriages per thousand 
non-married females aged fifteen years or older was 62.1 in 1970, this 
number decreased to 13.7 in 2010. Marriage has lost its pre-eminence 
amongst forms of cohabitation in Hungarian society. 
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Figure 6. Total first-marriage rate for females (per hundred females) and 
total divorce rate (per hundred marriages). Source: Demographic 
Yearbook (2010). 
Note: Total first-marriage rate indicates the share of males and females 
reaching the marrying age of fifteen years who enter marriage by a 
certain age (females forty-nine years, males fifty-nine years). It rests on 
the supposition that females and males reaching fifteen years of age will 
show the same disposition towards marriage as the rate of the given year. 
Total divorce rate indicates how many divorces occur in marriages 
entered in the reviewed period if the marriage-duration-specific divorce 
rates of the given year prevail. 
 
The data of Figure 6 show that marriage as the only accepted family 
form has eroded from two directions: the diminishing number of 
marriages and the increasing number of divorces. However, not only the 
absolute number of marriages but also the marriage rate has decreased. 
This process started in the 1980s and accelerated after 1990. In 1960 the 
probability of a woman marrying at least once in her life was almost 100 
per cent, but this probability has decreased to 39 per cent as of 2010. The 
1960 birth cohort reached the age of 50 in 2010 and the ratio of those 
never-married woman amongst them is now 7.8 per cent
28
. 
At the same time the absolute number of divorces remained at a high 
level, caused by an increase in the total divorce rate. The total divorce 
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rate was 0.2 in 1960 but it had doubled by 2010
29
. It means that if the 
divorce rates, according to marriage duration, of 2010 does not change, 
almost half of new marriages will end with divorce. Nowadays in 
Hungary it is difficult to regard marriage as a steady life-long 
relationship. 
The decline of marriage accompanied the growing average age at first 
marriage. In 1970 the average age at first marriage was 24.5 years for 
males and 21.8 years for females. In 2010 this is 31.4 years for males and 
28.7 years for females. Those who intend to marry postpone this decision 
to later ages than ever before in Hungary.
30
 Alongside this postponement 
a greater proportion of young adults choose cohabitation instead of 
marriage. As mentioned previously, cohabitation had a negative image 
during the golden age of the PSF. Nowadays 70 per cent of young adults 
choose cohabitation for their first steady form of partner-relationship and 
this rate is seven times higher than it was fifty years ago.
31
 It is obvious 
that some cohabiting partners will marry in the future (especially when 
they decide to have children), but there can be no reliable estimate of the 
number. We can suppose that cohabitation will also be a widely practised 
family form in the future
32
. 
The third fact which contributes to the decreasing number of 
marriages is that many in the younger generation do not live in steady 
partnerships. These young people belong to a number of groups. One 
group is the people living in Budapest or in the bigger cities, who are 
educated, and whose lifestyle is somewhat similar to single people living 
in Western countries. As we know from Utasi’s research,
33
 most of them 
would like to have a partner, but finding a partner to match their 
preferences is not easy. This is especially difficult for young females, as 
in Hungary – just like in other European countries – more females are 
enrolled than males in higher education. 
Another group of young people without steady partners are 
undereducated males living in villages. Unemployment or a lack of 
permanent jobs and income characterise them. Many of them are not able 
to start a family as they are greatly affected by the economic crisis. They 
remain in their parents’ home in ‘child-status’ in statistical terms. 
Postponing marriage is not a choice for them but a rational answer to 
their life experience and poor prospects. The marriage rate of males in 
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 Demographic Yearbook (2010) 
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 Note the relevance of Hajnal’s model for this country. 
31
 Spéder and Kapitány (2007). 
32
 Tóth (2007) 
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different communities reflects this fact. The first-marriage rate and 
marriage rate in various age groups is lower amongst males living in 
villages compared to Budapest and other cities. 
In the case of females the differences in first-marriage rate are not as 
sharp as in the case of males. However, we still find some differences by 
community type. Females in villages marry at relatively young ages – 
just like in previous decades. Other village females who did not marry 
until the age of thirty have a lower chance of doing so later. Village 
females largely finish their first marriage ‘wave’ when females who are 
living in Budapest and in other big cities just start it, around the age of 
thirty. 
The average duration of marriage before divorce is increasing 
constantly. It was 10.63 years in 1990 and 12.89 years in 2010. As in the 
last century, short-duration marriages were likeliest to end in divorce, but 
by 2010 the risk of divorce had increased in the case of longer-duration 
marriages too. In 2010, 39 per cent of divorces took place before the 
tenth year of married life, 33 per cent between ten and nineteen years, 
and 28 per cent after twenty years. An increasing number of long-
established marriages are dissolved every year. There is a similar trend in 
the age of divorce: 42 per cent of female divorcees were forty years or 
older in 2010 while this ratio was just 25 per cent in 2000. 
Divorce is a widespread practice both in villages and cities. The only 
important difference is in the age of partners at the time of divorce. If a 
village couple has not divorced before the wife reaches thirty, they are 
likely to stay together. The above-mentioned phenomenon of divorce 
after long-lasting marriage is more typical in Budapest and the big cities. 
 
2.3 Marriage and Divorce: Attitudes 
 
As demographic data show, marriage has lost its hegemony over family 
forms, especially amongst the younger generation. The change of 
attitudes reflects this process. In 2010 half of people aged fifty years and 
older considered marriage the ‘only acceptable partnership’, while only 
every fourth person of the younger generation thought the same.
34
 
Marriage has lost its hegemony but it is still highly rated in public: 80 
per cent of respondents would advise young people to live in marriage 
according to data produced in 2009. However, at the same time a 
majority of people (69.7 per cent) would also advise couples to live 
together before getting married,
35
 which there denotes an increasing 
departure from the PSF. Data from the International Social Survey 2002 
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show that more than half of Hungarians agree with the statement 
‘Married people are generally happier than unmarried people’; among 
European countries surveyed, the level of agreement with that statement 
in Hungary was one of the highest. There was no significant difference 
by age group; thus, while the young in Hungary were behaving in much 
the same way as their Western European peers, their attitudes towards 
marriage were the same as their parents’ attitudes.
36
 The most prominent 
research on Hungarian single people also supports the idea that 
Hungarian singles’ main desire is to have a steady relationship, 
especially marriage.
37
 
Therefore, we find that real behaviour and attitudes concerning 
marriage and other family forms are quite distinct but converging slowly. 
The spread of different family and partnership forms has preceded their 
public acceptance. However, the results of this modernisation and 
diversification of attitudes is now being realised in actual behaviour. 
The consistently high number of divorces reflects public acceptance of 
divorce as a preferred strategy for conflict resolution in marriage. 
Irrespective of age or gender, 58–60 per cent of those questioned agreed 
with the statement: ‘Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple 
can’t seem to work out their marriage problems.’
38
 There is general 
consensus across Europe on this question, the majority everywhere 
sharing this attitude. Thus, Hungarian views and behaviour here are in 
line with those in Western Europe. It is, nevertheless, important to note 
that despite the appearance of a few mediation organisations, Hungarian 
social institutions are still not sufficiently equipped to facilitate dignified 
divorce. 
 
2.4 Childbearing 
 
The decline of the birth rate has been an important political issue for 
every political regime, as the number of children per family has been 
falling since the beginning of the twentieth century. Even during the 
‘golden age’ of the PSF the total fertility rate decreased to under 2.00, 
and this rate was just 1.32 in 2009 and 1.26 in 2010. The fertility rate in 
Hungary is amongst the lowest in Europe. A similarly low fertility rate 
can be found in Portugal and Latvia. Not only has the birth rate 
decreased but the childbearing habits of different birth cohorts have also 
changed. 
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Figure 7. Average number of live-born children until given age by 
female birth cohort (number of live-born children per thousand females). 
Source: Demographic Yearbook (2010). 
 
As Figure 7 shows, uniformity of the PSF went together with 
uniformity of childbearing behaviour amongst females. Total fertility in 
the female birth cohorts of 1930–60 is very similar. They started 
childbirth in their early twenties; 1,000 females had roughly 1,200 
children by the age of twenty-five. By the age of thirty-five most of them 
had finished childbirth and they had given birth to all their children. The 
total fertility rate remained under 2.0 in these cohorts but very few of 
these women (5–7 per cent) remained childless. 
A characteristic change started with the birth cohort of 1970. Those 
females who were born in 1970 had just reached the age of twenty by the 
time of the change of regime. In previous years this age was the starting 
point for making a family. However, this birth cohort encountered the 
positive and negative effects of the new system and started to postpone 
the birth of their first child. Interestingly, already in 1989 when the first 
signs emerged of unemployment, young couples with their first child 
were visualising the threat of unemployment in their lives. It is obvious 
that many of them postponed the birth of their planned second, or later, 
third child. For many families this delay has resulted in fewer children 
than planned. Female members of the birth cohort of 1970 have just 
attained age forty. Biologically they may have more children but it seems 
most of them have now finished their period of fertility. 
Postponing children is more obvious in the younger cohorts. In the 
younger cohorts we see older mothers at the time of the birth of their first 
child. The mean age of mothers at the birth of their first child was 22.99 
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years in 1990, 25.02 years in 2000, and 28.23 years in 2010.
39
 It is 
possible that younger women will give birth to more children in older 
age and catch up to the older cohorts’ fertility rate, but the financial and 
socio-political crisis in Hungary persists and is likely to have an impact 
on this. As data show the number of crèches (institutional child care 
facilities for children under age 3) decreased from 1003 (1990) to 530 
(2005). A slight increasing started again in the last few years and for 
2011 the number of crèches reached 700. (Makay 2011) However, only 9 
% of children under age 3 years are attending crèches. This is a solid 
barrier in front of a mother to enter employment.   
Mothers living in different sizes of community population show sharp 
differences in the total fertility rate. Total fertility rate is 1.47 in the 
smallest villages but is 1.09–1.10 in the biggest cities of the country and 
in Budapest. The very small total fertility rate of Hungary originates first 
of all from the demographic behaviour of women living in Budapest and 
other big cities. Deeper analysis of the birth rate by educational level 
shows that women in the middle of society, with a secondary-level 
education, have the lowest fertility rate. Women with poor educational 
levels have a much higher fertility rate and women with the highest 
educational level have a slightly higher fertility rate.
40
 This data shows 
the emerging pluralisation of family forms in contemporary Hungary. 
The other important change concerning childbirth is the rapidly 
growing number of extramarital births. 
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Figure 8. Number of marital and extramarital live births. Source: 
Demographic Yearbook (2010). 
 
As can be seen in Figure 6 the data show that fewer than 10 per cent of 
children were born to parents who were not married in the 1980s; by 
2010 however, the figure had risen to 41 per cent. Naturally, two-thirds 
of the births to those unmarried involved a couple living together and not 
a single mother. Together with cohabitation, Hungarians have come to 
accept children born outside marriage (so long as they are born to people 
living together as partners). However, familist demographers worry 
about this situation. They argue that cohabitations are less stable than 
marriages and that fewer children will be born from this type of 
relationship. 
Characteristic differences can be found in the proportion of 
extramarital births in different community types. The smaller is the 
community, the higher the proportion of extramarital births. While 32.1 
per cent of children were born out of wedlock in Budapest, the 
proportion in other towns was 40.5 per cent and in villages it was 47.5 
per cent. This phenomenon is connected to the various types of marriage 
behaviour mentioned before: a great proportion of undereducated young 
people live in small  villages, they are unemployed without any chance 
of finding a job, and therefore they postpone marriage. They live without 
a steady partner or they cohabit and so their children are born outside 
marriage. The increase in the number and ratio of extramarital births is 
an adaptive behaviour, a reaction to the deep economic crisis and the low 
levels of support for families and parents. 
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2.5 Childbearing: Attitudes 
 
As presented, the decline in the number of births is not a new 
phenomenon in Hungary. Due to the high mortality rate together with the 
low birth rate, there has been a natural decrease since 1981. Here the gap 
between real demographic behaviour and attitudes is the broadest. 
Attitude surveys have always shown that childcare and child rearing 
have consistently been highly valued by Hungarians, so it is useful to 
look at changes over time in the response to one particular attitude 
statement: ‘People who have never had children lead an empty life’. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. ‘People who have never had children lead an empty life’ 
(percentage distribution of respondents by agreement with this 
statement). Sources: ISSP (1988, 1994, 2002). 
Note: Sample sizes in ISSP waves: ISSP (1988), N=1720; ISSP (1994), 
N=1500; ISSP (2002), N=1015 
This statement expresses a categorical evaluation, since it implies that 
the childless experience creates an unfillable absence in people’s lives. 
Amongst European countries, Hungary had an exceptionally high rate of 
respondents who agreed with this statement, well above that of other 
countries. However Figure 9 shows that the number of respondents who 
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agree with this statement is decreasing year by year. This change is 
especially strong amongst males. Unfortunately the latest data is from 
2002 so we can only suppose that this trend has continued. Even here, a 
polarisation of Hungarian society can be observed: 10–15 per cent of the 
young now envision their lives without children, an opinion which has 
never before found such strong expression.
41
 Conversely there are also 
young people who plan on having many children, often amongst the 
highly educated young urban intelligentsia. Summing up we find that not 
only family forms but also attitudes and values concerning childbirth 
have started to be more pluralistic. 
 
3 Gender Roles: Females’ Paid Work 
 
One of the key questions relating to gender roles is the family–work 
balance. During the 1980s, women in Hungary were characterised by a 
very high level of activity in the labour force. Not only the demands of 
the economy but also the ideology of the socialist regime played an 
important role in this level of activity. The employment rate reached its 
peak in 1990 when almost every women between the ages of fifteen and 
fifty-five was an active earner. The retirement age was lower than in 
most Western European countries (fifty-five for females and sixty for 
males), but the proportion of part-time workers was and remained until 
recently under 5 per cent. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Employment rates of males and females aged 15–64 in 
Hungary and the EU (1990–2009). Sources: Frey (1997,  2011). 
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1990 1997 2004 2007 2009
Hungarian males 83,3% 60,3% 63,1% 64,0% 61,1%
EU Males 75,9% 70,6% 70,3% 72,5% 70,7%
Hungarian females 68,9% 45,4% 50,7% 50,9% 49,9%
EU Females 49,5% 50,5% 55,4% 58,3% 58,6%
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As Figure 10 shows, the employment rate of males and especially 
females was higher in Hungary than in EU countries in 1990. After the 
political system changed, the employment rate of women and men 
drastically declined due to the economic transition, so that, during a short 
period, one million jobs disappeared. The changes affected male 
employees first as a lot of women simply left the labour market, many of 
them choosing early retirement or withdrawal to the household. From the 
mid-1990s unemployment reached female employees too.
42
 In 2009 the 
employment rate for both males and females is under the European 
average. This fact causes problems not only at the level of the macro-
economy but also at the level of families and individuals. 
As mentioned above, the PSF was typically a two-earner family. From 
the introduction of market-type elements into the economy in 1968, the 
total income of most families was supplemented with income coming 
from the second economy.
43
 Female paid work was a basic element of 
the family budget. The new, capitalist economy caused the closure of 
many workplaces and decreased the possibility of individuals getting 
additional income. Since 1990 social inequalities have been growing. 
Families typically do not have two steady incomes because the 
possibility of becoming unemployed is a real threat for everybody. To 
find a steady job is difficult especially for young people and those of 
lower educational levels. Families must adapt themselves to the situation, 
and in many cases the females are the only employed persons in the 
family. In this respect it is important to take into consideration the 
changing form of the family. There are more and more single females, 
divorced females, and single mothers and their personal income has 
primary importance for them. These facts show the importance of female 
employment for individuals and families, and in the light of this idea it is 
interesting to look at how attitudes have changed concerning female paid 
work. 
 
3.1 Gender Roles and Household Chores 
 
Besides female paid work, sharing household tasks is an important part 
of determining gender roles. As previously described, during the socialist 
period there was full employment for both males and females. In the 
meantime the development of services for doing household chores was 
poor. As part of the ideology of the Communist Party, the people were 
promised a network of cheap services in order ‘to help women with 
household tasks’. Laundry, cleaning or food delivery services were 
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organised under the state economy but were characterised by permanent 
shortages. Furthermore, the quality of these services was poor. When the 
marketisation of the economy started, new and high-quality services 
were developed, but they were too expensive for the majority of families. 
This resulted in housework remaining within the frame of the family and 
delegated to women, just as in previous historical periods. In the socialist 
era women worked full time and after work-hours they did the household 
chores too. Though a public discourse emerged from time to time about 
the ‘second shift’ of women, the question of more active participation by 
men in housework did not get much attention. 
Relatively, the most available services were childcare institutions for 
children under school age. Many workplaces and also local councils ran 
crèches and kindergartens, but there were a lot of problems with the 
quality of these services. Many complained because of overcrowding, the 
limited opening hours, and the generally rigid care-system. Obviously it 
was a double-sided issue: working mothers were able to put their 
children into a professional and safe place while they were working, but 
in the meantime they struggled with continual remorse as they felt it 
would be better to stay at home with them. This feeling was strengthened 
by Hungarian psychologists, who stressed that childcare institutions were 
disadvantageous for all children.
44
 
After the change of regime, state participation decreased dramatically 
in social services and especially in childcare institutions. Workplaces 
were not able to support their own crèches and kindergartens and so 
closed them. New market-run social services emerged but they were too 
expensive for a great proportion of families. Families and especially 
women had to find ways to manage household tasks and childcare using 
their own resources. 
In comparison with Europe, Hungarian women spend much more time 
on household tasks. International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data 
from 2002 show that the inequality between men and women in this 
regard is also highly significant. Hungarian women spend 27–28 hours 
per week and men spend 10–11 hours per week on household chores. In 
the majority of families more than 75 per cent of household tasks are 
done by females.
45
 Neither his own employment status nor his 
wife’s/partner’s employment status influences a male’s participation in 
these tasks. As sociologist Blaskó stresses: ‘We cannot experience the 
reorganisation of tasks and the change of gender roles in cases where the 
family model is the opposite of the traditional one and the wife is the 
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wage-earner.’
46
 Females also spend far more time on housework if there 
is a child under the age of six in the family and if the family is living in 
rural surroundings. Better financial situations and higher education of 
females may reduce the hours spent on household tasks. There is a slight 
but significant effect of the attitudes of females on the amount of their 
household work: the more modern her attitude, the less is the time she 
spends on household tasks. In contrast to this, in the case of males, a 
modern or traditional attitude seems to have no effect on the amount of 
household tasks they do or the time they spend on them. 
As Blaskó argues: ‘Females do not lay claim to an equal share of 
household chores – they find it unfair only in the case of extreme 
inequality.’
47
 She also says that there is little benefit in trying to ‘free’ 
women from the burden of housework as it is not a real burden for the 
majority of them. It would be more important to find a way for them to 
do part-time work, as this would make it possible for women to 
harmonise work and family life. 
 
3.2 Gender Roles and Household Chores: Attitudes 
 
Though Hungarian males and females share housework in a very unequal 
way, the majority of females (and of course males) do not find it unfair at 
all. As research has shown, Hungarian women are satisfied with their 
husbands’ small contribution to household tasks.
48
 The main reason for 
this is that household chores are basically regarded as a female task. The 
next attitude question demonstrates how public opinion has changed over 
time. 
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Figure 11. ‘A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after 
home and family’ (percentage distribution of respondents by agreement 
with this statement). Sources: ISSP (1988, 1994, 2002, 2008). 
Note: Sample sizes in ISSP waves: ISSP (1988), N=1720; ISSP (1994), 
N=1500; ISSP (2002), N=1015 ISSP (2008), N=1010  
The attitude statement in Figure 11 makes a sharp distinction between 
gender roles, and therefore agreement with this statement expresses a 
very traditional view. Just like in other attitude questions, respondents 
place Hungary amongst the most conservative countries in every 
research wave. Hungarian people showed relatively the most modern 
attitudes in 1988. Though 50.6 per cent of males and 39.6 per cent of 
females agreed with the gender-specific share of roles, every third male 
and almost every second female disagreed with it. By 1994, after several 
years of economic and political changes, a more conservative view had 
emerged. The most radical changes happened amongst women. More 
than 50 per cent of them supported a traditional share of gender roles and 
just 20 per cent supported the modern one. From 2008 there has been a 
slow modernisation in attitudes concerning gender roles, but Hungarian 
people are far less modern in this aspect than they were during the 
socialist regime. The high proportion of people expressing uncertainty is 
also an important sign. It is not easy for people to fit their real 
experiences with the strengthening of the familist argument. Concerning 
the sharing of housework, real behaviour and people’s attitudes are very 
similar. No gap can be found in case of males as there is a broad 
consensus on the ‘right’ division of household tasks and the majority of 
couples adapt to it in everyday life. In case of females more doubt is 
formulating but only every third persons agree with equal share of 
household tasks.  
 
3.3 Widening or Narrowing Gaps? 
 
Summing up, we underline the new complexity of attitudes and real 
behaviour concerning family types and gender roles. Hungarian people 
live now in more pluralistic family and other partnership forms than they 
did in earlier periods, and their attitudes have moved towards modernity 
too. However, the pace of these changes is not at all uniform. In 
Hungarian families the sharing of household tasks is very conservative, 
as are the attitudes concerning it. In Hungary the fertility rate started to 
decline many decades ago but attitudes about child rearing are moving 
only very slowly away from conservative position. Marriage became one 
of many forms of cohabitation, and attitudes changed towards modernity 
at a relatively quick pace. The most contradictory issue is that of females’ 
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paid work. Families and also individuals need the paid work of women 
or at least the income from it, but attitudes towards it remain very 
conservative. The broadest gap between behaviour and attitudes can be 
found here. It may be supposed that familist ideology keeps these 
conservative attitudes alive. 
During the Communist era most social inequalities remained hidden. 
People felt that most in society were living a very similar way of life 
with similar opportunities. This feeling had little to do with reality in a 
lot of areas, but with respect to marriage and family it was not far from 
reality. 
From the 1980s, social inequalities became more prominent in 
Hungarian society. What is more, new inequalities have emerged. Some 
of them have played an important role in the changing of family forms 
and of course in the changing of attitudes too. The most important can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
(1) The majority of the younger generation spend a longer period in 
school, and as the number of students in tertiary education has 
increased so the number of female students in higher education 
has outnumbered males. 
(2) Income differences split society into strata with very different 
life chances. Only a minority of young people are able to live a 
single life, maintain a one-person household, or maintain a high 
standard of living from one income. Meanwhile, for others, to 
marry and to start a family has also become an inaccessible 
dream. 
(3) The majority of young couples realise that one or more child in 
the family may ruin their financial situation and/or career. To 
have children is not an easy decision when considering these 
consequences. 
(4) Marketisation and the disappearance of full employment hit 
different social groups in a selective way. In some social groups 
the threat of becoming unemployed is an everyday reality for all 
adult members of the family. 
 
By comparing the historical and sociological trends, we could find 
that, first, the chronological differences are more relevant than the spatial 
differences; and second, that behind the spatial differences we could 
point out the local appearance of other types of social inequalities. For 
example, the rate of marriages per 1000 by region was highest in the 
central parts of the county, while lowest in the eastern areas. The 
difference between the highest and lowest categories by region is only 16 
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per cent, while the national average diminished by 25 per cent just 
between 2000 and 2010 (between 1990 and 2010 the decrease was 43.75 
per cent).
49
 However, if this rate is rearranged by counties and especially 
by small areas
50
 the picture becomes much more sophisticated: there are 
areas with higher and lower marriage rates in all parts of the country. The 
difference between highest and lowest marriage rates in small areas is 66 
per cent, but these differences are explainable better by income and 
educational inequalities than by spatial differences alone. 
These inequalities appear in an aggregated way in the case of the 
Roma ethnic group. The Roma (about 5.3 per cent of the population in 
2003) have suffered discrimination and social inequality of every type 
for a very long time, and they live, to a great extent, in spatial 
segregation.
51
 Before 1990, Roma men experienced full employment. 
This vanished at one stroke after the system changed: in the early 1990s 
only one-quarter of Roma men were full-time employees. However, the 
Roma/non Roma distinction has a deceptive homogenising effect: the 
employment of the Roma in Budapest and its outskirts has been similar 
to the average of the overall population, while in northern and eastern 
Hungary there were some small areas where the Roma are over-
represented and where this rate has sometimes approached zero. 
In other areas we could find similar relationships. For example, 
according to comprehensive sociological studies
52
 the fertility of the 
Roma is higher than the overall average, but has begun to diminish too. 
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52 István Kemény and his collegues have produced three sets of research which cover 
the Roma population (Kemény et al. 2004). 
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Figure 12. Number of live-born children per thousand females. Sources: 
Hungarian Statistical Office and Kemény et al. (2004,17). 
 
We have to emphasis again that ‘the Roma’ are not as homogeneous as 
the non-Roma majority often thinks they are. There is a small amount of 
data which suggests a relationship between the demographic trends of 
the Roma and segregation: Roma women living in an exclusively Roma 
neighbourhood have significantly more children and bear their first 
children earlier than Roma women who live amongst the rest of society.
53
 
János Ladányi and Iván Szelényi have found a clear relationship 
between the social positions of some special Roma communities, their 
family structure, and demographic tendencies, albeit on the basis of data 
from a single village. In this village, Csenyéte, the local Roma were part 
of the lower class in the nineteenth century, then around the beginning of 
the twentieth century the Roma became a segregated minority in an 
underclass position, then from the 1960s to 1990 they reached the 
relatively better but still lower position again. Meanwhile the Roma had 
also become the majority of the village’s population. By 1990 no non-
Roma lived in Csenyéte, and the whole population began to sink again 
into an underclass. Nowadays the number of marriages in the village is 
minimal and birth rates have increased.
54
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4 Interpretation of Changes: 
Familism and the Making of the ‘Traditional Family’ 
 
4.1 The Concept of Familism 
 
We use the term of familism as a complex term which refers to a special 
social condition (or set of social conditions) and also to a particular 
ideology (though not of course in a strictly political sense).
55
 For 
simplicity this chapter will describe these two aspects as social familism 
and ideological familism, respectively. Every institution, legal regulation, 
or economic context which pushes people towards living in marriage and 
with family could be construed/interpreted as social familism. Every set 
of ideas which associates only positive values with the normative family, 
places the family in the centre of social discourse, which presents the 
family as an incubator of macro-level sociability or, with other 
metaphors, as the basic building-block of society; could be 
construed/interpreted as ideological familism.
56
 
In the authors’ view, the historical antecedents, mostly from the age of 
state socialism (1945–90), and then from the contemporary era since 
1990 have affirmed people’s inclination to live in family and to rely upon 
family members in preference to others. This is the origin of their social 
familism. This social familism is a reaction to the situation in which 
people are distrustful of the great institutions of state and are therefore 
not able to establish a strong civil society. 
In theory this social condition would be independent of familist 
ideology, but throughout history these two phenomena have strongly 
tended to accompany each other. Ideological familism is a kind of 
‘legitimisation’ of the distrust and the social passivity following from this 
attitude (with people largely feeling that ‘nowadays people can rely on 
only their family’). What is more, ideological familism assigns positive 
values to the behaviour and attitudes arising from social familism 
(typified by sayings such as: ‘to establish a family means responsibility 
in the face of egoism’).
57
 Thus, familism responds to crises of values 
and, at least in theory, offers an action programme at the micro-level, that 
                                                                                                        
most of the twentieth century this average was 22–24 years in the village. In the latest 
period when only the Roma lived in Csenyéte the mothers’ average age dropped to 17.7 
years (Ladányi and Szelényi 2004, 61–67). 
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In international literature on familism, egoism and individualism have been identified 
by some as amoral phenomena (Banfield 1958; Fukuyama 1995; Torsello 2004). 
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is, ‘getting married and having children is the best strategy to integrate 
the whole of society.’ 
 
4.2 Making the ‘Traditional Family’ 
 
Theoretically this normative familist ‘family’ could be very diverse, but 
in this kind of discourse a single type has emerged as ‘ideal’: the so-
called traditional family (TF). 
The image of this ‘traditional family’ is obviously a whole family that 
is made up of a married couple with children.
58
 This construction 
stresses the long-term stability of the relationship, the fixed and clearly 
defined gender roles, and supposes a historically strong emotional bond 
between family members. The ideal-type ‘traditional family’ is 
dominated by the husband, who represents the family out of home, the 
wife’s terrain being the household and not working for pay. Children are 
obedient and get emotional support from their mother and moral rules 
from their father. According to the familist argument this ideal 
‘traditional family’ was an almost uniform, invariable, and intact family 
model throughout the whole pre-1945 period (at least in villages). The 
same arguments stress that the social changes of the last seventy years 
broke this ideal family into pieces. 
The TF-image is a combination of some elements of the real PSF-
model and the ideals of the familist ideology. A good example to 
illustrate this is the treatment of women’s employment. In the implicit 
background of the TF-image stands the small, economically self-
sufficient peasant farm. However, in the whole of early modernity only a 
very small fraction of the peasantry lived in conditions at all similar to 
this ideal. Furthermore, until 1849 serfdom still existed and even by the 
end of the nineteenth century less than half of the population worked in 
the agricultural sector. Also, before 1945 the majority of the women did 
paid work, in at least in some periods of their life, and the ‘housewife’-
model was a norm only in the middle class. The new regime after 1945 
was hostile to this norm and also to the former middle class. The socialist 
form of the economy and a social policy subordinated to its totalitarian 
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endeavours could enforce the almost full employment of women. Despite 
the often stressed slogans of the Communist regime that ‘Work ennobles 
you!’, the situation enhanced the feeling that women’s paid work was 
social coercion and not an organic part of their life. This feeling has 
become stronger since 1990, when full employment abruptly ceased in 
the wake of the political change. The attitude that ‘a woman’s place is in 
the family not in the workplace’ was a reaction to the decay of the PSF 
and the collapse of the socialist system (both of them enhanced the sense 
of a value crisis). It was also a good tool for males to ‘legitimise’ anti-
female discrimination in the labour market, or for females to rationalise 
(in a psychological sense) their lesser chances of finding work. 
As a result of the above-mentioned processes, familism as an ideology 
became very popular from the late 1980s/early 1990s. Thus, most people 
agree with the familist thesis, although meanwhile most families, as 
shown above, differ from this ideal. Therefore, a gap has opened 
between the real life of families and the attitudes/values shared by the 
members of these families. 
According to our hypotheses one of the most important reasons for 
this gap is the advantage of the coherence of familist ideology. This 
means that familist attitudes and value-statements fit into a coherent 
world view. This world view seems not just to be an idea, but a value-
system and a reality as well – because of the widely accepted idea that 
the ‘traditional family’ really existed and was a stable, long unchanged 
institution in spite of continuous changes in macro-level society and the 
political system. The TF-image is essentially a utopia – but with strong 
relations to reality: a (theoretically) available life-alternative because 
people could make themselves believe that ‘my grandparents lived in 
such a family’ and ‘even I could live a similar family if I meet a suitable 
partner.’ It is noteworthy that while the ideological divisions of the 
country have become more and more antagonistic, and at times fiercely 
divided, the traditionalism of familism is accepted in almost every 
section of the political spectrum. 
Non-familist ideologies have lacked the coherence of familism. For 
multiple reasons, feminism with its egalitarian values and attitudes never 
really took root in Hungary, and this situation has resulted in the core 
discourses about the family lacking questions about women’s liberation, 
gender equality, or, consequently, possible new roles and identities for 
males. The non-familist views could only really formulate their own 
theses in negative form, as critics of familism. Arguments such as ‘the 
traditional family in reality was…’, ‘women’s employment in the past 
was more common…’, and ‘it is not always the case that maintaining a 
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marriage is always valuable, if…’ would be correct intellectually but 
lack the ‘sex appeal’ of the familist utopia. 
However, as we could see above: in recent years the gap again has 
become narrower: the majority of people’s values/attitudes have started 
to follow real situations. This change has sometimes been relatively 
slight, as was shown in relation to women’s paid work in Figure 10. 
Sometimes the familist opinion has moved from a majority view to a 
minority one, as can be seen in responses to the following statement: 
‘Family life suffers from the wife’s full-time employment.’ In 2000, 56.8 
per cent of people agreed, but in 2009 only 36.6 per cent agreed (in this 
case the gender-specific differences are not relevant).
59
 Sometimes the 
changes have been more drastic. For example: in 1991 only 20.4 per cent 
agreed with the statement that: ‘It’s all the same for children whether 
their parents are married or not’, but in 2009 the agreement rate was 51.7 
per cent.
60
 
 
4.3 Consistent Attitudes, Inconsistent Attitudes 
 
The above cited authors do not try to hide their familist involvement, and 
they try to fit these single-value statements into coherent value-systems. 
They find that after the 1990 political system change, ‘consistent 
modern’ values and attitudes were forced back while ‘consistent 
traditional’ values came forward – but these tendencies again altered in 
the twenty-first century. 
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 Pongrácz and S. Molnár (2011, 103). 
60
 S. Molnár (2011, 54). 
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Figure 13. Consistent modern and consistent traditional values and 
attitudes (percentage of men and women aged between eighteen and 
fifty, 1988–2009). Sources: Vaskovics (2000, 292); Pongrácz and S. 
Molnár (2011, 109). 
 
However, if we consider carefully Figure 13 it is noticeable that these 
two ‘consistent’ groups together represent only a minority of the 
population. The majority of people during the whole period had the 
attitude system treated by the researchers as incoherent or ‘mixed 
modern-traditional’, as Figure 14 shows. 
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Figure 14. Modern and traditional values and attitudes (percentage of 
men and women aged between eighteen and fifty, 1988–2009). Sources: 
Vaskovics (2000, 292); Pongrácz and S. Molnár (2011, 109). 
 
Despite the situation that more and more people could accept single 
statements which are incompatible with the familist norms, in discourse 
there always prevails what was termed above the advance of coherence. 
The majority live in non-familist families, but they have no voices. 
 
4.4 Towards a New Pluralistic Family Structure 
 
As was presented above, a permanent change is going on regarding 
family structures, gender roles, and also attitudes in contemporary 
Hungarian society. Familist ideology is very strong (and it is also 
supported by government policy) but a lot of people live in a very 
different way. Real behaviour and attitudes are distant from each other in 
the case of people with ‘mixed modern–traditional’ attitudes, and of 
course they tend to coincide in the case of some other people. It seems 
that classical socio-economic variables cannot give a suitable 
explanation of how people can reconcile their behaviour and attitudes. In 
Table 1 we present a hypothetical model of existing family types and 
their main characteristics in Hungary.  
 
 
Table 1. A hypothetical model of family forms and their main 
characteristics. 
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Family type 
Does 
the 
female 
work? 
Number 
of 
children 
Female’s 
educational 
level 
Household 
chores 
Conflict 
between ideals 
and real life 
A. Many 
children – 
new type 
No 3+ high 
Female + 
paid help 
No conflicts – 
conservative 
ideals and life. 
      
B. Many 
children – 
old type 
No 3+ low 
Female + 
extended 
family 
No conflicts – 
conservative 
ideals and life. 
C. One-
earner family 
No 1–2 low, middle Female 
 
On the surface 
no conflict – but 
fewer children 
then it was 
planned and 
may have some 
female paid 
work because of 
poverty 
D. 
Traditional 
two-earner 
family 
Yes 1–2 middle, high 
Female + 
male ‘helps’ 
Strong conflicts 
in all spheres 
E. One 
person/one 
parent family 
Yes 0, 1–2 
low, middle, 
high 
Adults fends 
for 
themselves 
Conflicts in 
spheres of 
partnership 
relations and to 
have children 
F. Modern 
two earner 
family 
Yes 0, 1–2 high Shared 
 
No conflicts – 
modern ideals 
and life 
 
The main features of these family forms are: 
A. ‘Many children – new type’: highly educated male and female, 
male is well-paid entrepreneur or manager, 3+ children, wife has 
no paid work at least while the children are under 10. No 
conflict between conservative attitudes and real behaviour. 
B. ‘Many children – old type’: poor, undereducated, unemployed 
family, they may belong to Roma ethnic minority. Little and 
casual income from social support or odd jobs. Female can be 
the head of family but when male is present he is the head 
without doubt. 3+ children. They may live in extended family, 
but only for lack of accommodation and poverty. No conflict 
between conservative attitudes and real behaviour. 
C. ‘One earner family’: female is at home with 1–2 children. 
Initially on childcare leave, but then after that she cannot find a 
job. Male’s job is also in danger. Poor educational level. 
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Theoretically there is no conflict between attitudes and real life 
but danger of poverty leads to fewer children than they planned 
and woman must go to work (in the case that she can). 
D. ‘Traditional two-earner family’: this was the most common 
family type under socialism, and it may be the most common 
even now. Persons are more educated in this model than  in 
model C. Lower number of children than it was planned earlier. 
Strong feeling of discrepancy between attitudes and real life. 
E. ‘One person/one parent family’: divorced persons, singles, 
people living without permanent partner relationship – with or 
without children. He/she is working for pay. He/she experiences 
conflicts between attitudes and life because of a lack of 
permanent partner and child(ren). 
F. ‘Modern two-earner family’: couple has modern attitudes and 
can live a modern lifestyle too. They have no major conflicts 
over these issues. Usually they have no 3 or more children as 
they cannot make enough money for paid help in childcare and 
household.  
 
As was mentioned previously, most sociological and demographic 
research deals with the reasons for and consequences of the change in the 
‘traditional family’. It is not easy to get any funding for other types of 
research. Therefore, unfortunately, we have no data about the proportions 
of these family types in relation to the total. Nevertheless, this paper has 
unveiled a way to test this model, and the authors are sure that this model 
is good starting point for further empirical analysis. To present incidence 
of these types will stand in the centre of another empirical paper by 
authors.   
 
5 Conclusions 
 
One piece of contemporary literature by Bernadett Csurgó and Luca 
Kristóf,
61
 based on the European Social Study’s data, starts ‘from the 
preconception that value-motivated behaviour is behind the stability of a 
family structure and marriage, which behaviour… [is] connected to some 
general attitudes and values’. However, the authors are compelled to 
conclude that the value system has less importance in the explanations of 
the differences in the model, and that furthermore ‘above all the 
demographic characteristics, mostly age and educational qualification 
cause the differences in the value system.’
62
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In our view the above analysed data and tendencies are in agreement 
with the characteristics of the second demographic transition (SDT) 
being as follows: weakening of marriage as a norm, postponing the 
average age of the first marriage, a growing rate of single people and 
couples living together without marriage, and diminishing of the fertility 
rates. Theorists dealing with the SDT have mentioned more 
determinants, but they emphasise the role of changes in the value system, 
growing individualism, and the emergence of a ‘post-materialist value 
system’, as Ron Inglehart named it.
63
 According to a typical 
formulation, the ‘innovators’ of the new family lifestyles ‘have often 
been persons with sympathies for the ‘new left’ during the 1960s and 
1970s … and even today premarital cohabitation has remained a 
correlate of secularism, tolerance for minorities, relativism in ethics, 
gender-equality, nonconformist education values, and a preference for 
leftist or green parties in countries such as Germany, France, the 
Netherlands and Belgium’.
64
 
In our study we have tried to demonstrate that at least in Hungary the 
direction of causality seems to be the opposite: the changes which are 
described by means of the SDT-concept occurred before the relevant 
changes in the value system. However, the dominant line in the discourse 
on family life and gender roles was familism, which explicitly tries to 
reverse the process. 
Contemporary ideological familism is an interesting mixture of some 
traditional values and reminiscences about the definitely modern Post-
war Standard Family, which is ‘masked’ in the familist discourse as the 
‘traditional family’. Familism is a traditionalist, not a traditional idea, 
but this ideology is accepted by greater proportion of the Hungarian 
population than is political traditionalism. According to our hypotheses 
the coherence of familism and the disintegration of alternative ideologies 
could have caused this gap. However, perhaps over the last decade this 
gap has begun to narrow. 
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